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D iscussions of medical malprac- 
tice seem to end up at either of two 
extremes: the trial lawyer’s view that 
injured patients deserve compensa- 
tion, with the treating physician the 
best source; and the doctor’s view that 
such suits unfairly penalize judgmental 
errors while raising the costs of prac- 
ticing medicine. The parties to this 
debate make different assumptions 
about the nature, purpose, and likely 
impact of malpractice suits; as a result, 
the issues are muddied rather than 
clarified. This article suggests that, 
viewed in light of recent studies of iat- 
rogenic illness in hospital settings, 
malpractice litigation may help rather 
than hinder the quality of medical 
care delivered. 
latrogenesis, defined as the undesir- 
able side-effects of medical interven- 
tions, is not a new phenomenon. The 
major study undertaken by the De- 
partment of Health, Education and 
Welfare in 1973 noted that a substan- 
tial percentage of adverse medical out- 
comes occur as the result of treat- 
ment.’ Others have concluded that 
many surgical deaths are avoidable.* 
Two recent studies have added fuel to 
the smoldering controversy over the 
nature and extent of such medical 
mishaps, drawing attention to a range 
of medical errors and raising again the 
question of the tort system’s relation- 
ship with medical error. The two 
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studies, in the NEW ENGLAND JOUR- 
NAL OF MEDICINE, focused upon surgi- 
cal mishaps in one case3 and iatro- 
genic illness in a general medical 
service at a university hospital in 
the ~ e c o n d . ~  
The first study, surveying avoidable 
adverse outcomes from colonic sur- 
gery, concluded that “[tlhe penalties 
for such misadventures turned out to 
be severe, with 10 times the mortality, 
seven times the average cost, and four 
times the length of hospitalization 
expected in average patients under- 
going comparable but uncomplicated 
colonic surgical procedures.”s Of 56 
types of errors which occurred, 31 
were “those of unnecessary, contra- 
indicated, or technically defective sur- 
gical activity.’I6 Other sources of the 
medical “errors” were identified by the 
authors, admittedly in an impres- 
sionistic fashion, as misplaced o p  
timism, a sense of unwarranted 
urgency, the urge for perfection, and 
the use of vogue therapies: all errors of 
commission. From a legal standpoint, 
according to the authors, “none a p  
pears to have involved negligence.”’ 
The authors were concerned about 
their findings, and proposed that a 
legal safeguard was needed against 
malpractice suits for errors in judg- 
ment, i.e., “error simply related to 
flawed reasoning” as opposed to negli- 
gence.s Malpractice suits only suc- 
ceed, according to the authors, in 
driving into concealment the “forces 
that could help to reveal and control 
epidemiologic sources of error.”9 
The culprit of the study is made out 
to be the tort system, with fear of liti- 
gation blocking broader disclosure of 
hazards, better studies, and open dis- 
cussion. The asserted link between 
medical error and malpractice is a 
curious one, following the authors’ 
premises: (1) many severe iatrogenic 
events occur, (2)  due primarily to 
physician judgmental error, (3) which 
errors could be minimized by better 
data collection and discussion, (4) ex- 
cept for the effect of malpractice liti- 
gation in stifling said reforms, even 
though (5) none of the examples 
which the authors cite involve negli- 
gence. It is as though a mandatory 
swipe at malpractice litigation is 
necessary to top off the study. 
In light of recent studies of iat. 
rogenic illness in the hospital 
setting, malpractice litigation 
may help rather than hinder 
the quality of medical care 
delivered. 
The second study, of general medi- 
cal services at a university hospital, 
monitored 815 patients during a five- 
month period in 1979.1° Of these, 290 
(36 percent) had one or more iat- 
rogenic illnesses, 76 (9 percent) had 
major complications, and of the 15 
who died (2  percent of all patients 
and more than 5 percent of those with 
complications), iatrogenic illness 
was believed to be a contributing 
cause. The intervention categories 
were drugs, diagnostic and therapeutic 
procedures, and miscellaneous others. 
The authors’ overall conclusion was 
that “the risk incurred during hospitali- 
zation is not trivial” and that “the risk 
of a serious problem may well have 
increased” in the last 20 years. * 1 
Causes mentioned included routine 
monitoring of a range of physiologic 
characteristics, often leading to ear- 
lier interventions than might have 
occurred in the past; use of a wide range 
of potent drugs; and therapeutic proce- 
dures in general. The authors made 
no judgment as to negligence and iatro- 
genesis. As in the first study, however, 
these authors issued a clarion call for 
better mechanisms “to assess the haz, 
ards of hospitalization in an ongoing 
manner,”’* for an intensified search 
for means to reduce the frequency and 
severity of iatrogenic events, and for 
a shared concern for deficiencies in 
medical review within the hospital. 
Medical Error and Culpability 
The level of patient harm demon- 
strated by these recent studies raises 
the question of the interface of mal- 
practice litigation with risk reduction, 
a relationship which the studies as- 
sumed was either detrimental or too 
insignificant to mention. However, a 
sophisticated view of tort litigation 
suggests that it may be a valuable ad- 
junct to other professional reforms and 
in fact can be a central force in pro- 
moting change. A brief summation of 
the kinds of medical error raised in 
these studies reveals suggestive 
connections between error and 
culpability. 
Tort rules have traditionally at- 
tempted to render the plaintiff whole 
by forcing a defendant to pay compen- 
sation, with the justification that the 
defendant can fairly be taxed because 
of his “fault” in injuring the plaintiff. 
Two categories of “fault” are normally 
included within the category of mal- 
practice: intentional harmful acts and 
negligent acts. 
Willful harmful acts. Intentional 
torts include a knowing deviation, 
without good cause, from the profes- 
sional or ethical norms of practice for 
the profession or from recognized pro- 
cedures and techniques for treatment. 
The roots of the informed consent 
doctrine can be traced to the inten- 
tional tort of battery, for example, ac- 
knowledging the connection between 
a surgical “touching” and the knowing 
withholding of information from the 
patient.” Also in this category are 
cases of excessive surgery, such as the 
infamous case of Dr. Nork, who per- 
formed countless surgical procedures 
which he knew to be unnecessary and 
which he also knew he was incompe- 
tent to perform.I4 
Negligent acts, as measured by 
professional standards. Negligence 
provides the usual basis for a malprac- 
tice action. I t  is defined as unskillful 
practice causing injury to the patient, 
as a result of a failure to exercise the 
“reasonable degree of skill, knowledge, 
and care”15 appropriate under the 
circumstances. The reasons for a physi- 
cian’s failure to follow an accepted 
standard can be many: inattentiveness 
on a particular occasion, even though 
he is a skillful. well-trained doctor; 
a systematic failure of training, in 
which a physician has not kept up with 
his field; or a personal inability of the 
physician to deal with this particular 
problem by, for example, operating 
outside his sphere of competence. 
Even though the particular physician 
Discussions of rofessional r e p  
lation tend to gwnplay the role 
of malpractice litigation, pore 
traying it as useful only for the 
sanction of gross violations of 
professional norms. In fact, such 
litigation should be viewed as a 
form of “microregulation” of 
undesirable practices. 
has considered the consequences of 
treatment and has exercised his best 
judgment, his conduct is still measured 
by an external standard of the reason- 
able practitioner in his position. 
The legal system has deemed it fair 
to hold a physician accountable for 
these two categories of medical errors 
in a malpractice suit. They imply that 
the physician has failed to conduct 
himself at that level of practice which 
his professional membership indicates 
he should have achieved, and which 
he presumably could have achieved, 
with diligence. In these two categories 
of error, the focus is upon the indi- 
vidual practitioner and his deviation, 
whether intentional or negligent, from 
a norm. The types of error likely to be 
detected are those of the unethical or 
slipshod doctor. who is probably a 
cause of a small, although significant, 
percentage of harm. The types of med- 
ical errors revealed by the studies dis- 
cussed above, however, tend to fall 
into neither of these categories, sug- 
gesting that there are at least two 
further categories of medical error, 
and their existence tests the limits of 
current malpractice doctrine. 
Errors based upon professional 
shortcomings. Deficiencies within a 
medical specialty may cause iatrogenic 
harm. These may include problems 
of scientific ignorance, inadequate 
evaluation of diagnostic instruments 
and procedures before use, or failures 
to educate members. A medical spe- 
cialty may be in its infancy, so that 
knowledge about etiologies of illness 
and techniques of treatment is incom- 
plete. Those therapeutic techniques 
which are available may not yet have 
been sufficiently perfected to eliminate 
substantial risks of side effects. l6 
Although injury to a patient may be 
caused by the shortcomings of a par- 
ticular therapist in a given case, it is 
not the individual’s failure, but rather 
that of the profession as a whole which 
can fairly be said to have caused in- 
jury. We are therefore troubled, at 
least initially, by singling out the indi- 
vidual physician for liability. It is re- 
ally a form of vicarious liability we are 
imposing, in which the profession is 
collectively at fault, but a particular 
therapist is being penalized for collec- 
tive shortcomings. The causes cited by 
the studies suggest that errors in this 
category (e.g., vogue therapies, multi- 
ple drug administration) account for a 
significant percentage of the iatrogenic 
harms suffered.” 
Errors related to work setting. The 
context of both studies, discussed 
above, the modern hospital, provides 
a fourth set of medical errors. While 
solo practice has long been the ideal in 
medical practice, physicians’ need for 
a hospital connection has created the 
present form of practice, which is col- 
legial, operating within hospitals and 
group practices. By 1975, no physician 
would consider practicing without the 
resources that hospital affiliation 
brought, and one in four of the 
530,000 active physicians practiced 
full-time in a hospita1.l” In that same 
year, over 18 percent of all active 
physicians practiced in groups of three 
or more.i9 Almost 80 percent of the 
incidents that lead to malpractice 
claims occur in hospitals, reflecting 
the primacy of the hospital as the 
locus of most medical practice.20 The 
work setting of the hospital provides a 
context in which “persistent and pow- 
erful demands cause the individual to 
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behave in a certain way regardless of 
his personal qualities.”21 These de- 
mands can lead to peer pressure 
against questioning a colleague’s 
judgment or informing on  his errors. 
Alternatively, the incentive structure 
can be changed in directions which 
tend to uncover errors.** 
Discussions of professional regula- 
tion tend to downplay the role of 
malpractice litigation, portraying it as 
useful only for the sanction of gross 
violations of professional norms. In 
fact, such litigation should be viewed 
as a form of “microregulation” of un- 
desirable practices. The legal system 
essentially acts as a form of control 
over activities that cause injuries. It 
holds those involved in an activity ac- 
countable for staying informed about 
progress in a field, and judges the 
standards by which the activity is per- 
formed. In malpractice cases, the 
customary practice of the profession 
generally determines the standard of 
care against which an individual’s be- 
havior will be judged. The medical 
profession has the privilege of setting 
its own standard of conduct, by merely 
adopting and acknowledging its own 
treatment practices.23 
The justification for this has been 
courts’ perceived lack of expertise in 
judging another profession, and their 
fear of imposing liability based upon 
an uninformed judgment. Where the 
customary practice of the profession 
has been inadequate, dangerous, or 
out-of-date, the plaintiff has lacked a 
doctrinal basis for attacking the stan- 
dard itself. On rare occasions, courts 
have recognized that a customary med- 
ical practice may be negligent. Thus, 
in Helling v. Carey, 24 the Washington 
Supreme Court held that the defen- 
dant ophthalmologists were negligent 
us a matter of law in failing to adminis- 
ter a simple glaucoma test, despite un- 
contradicted expert testimony that it 
was universal practice not to so test 
patients under the age of 40. 
Helling, and a minority of other 
cases,25 have involved a therapy or 
diagnostic procedure which was 
readily understandable by lay persons. 
This has allowed the trier of fact to 
weigh - without expert testimony - 
the relative risk of injury caused by the 
procedure and by its omission. These 
cases have not been followed by most 
jurisdictions, since courts are normally 
reluctant to set their own standards of 
care in place of those established by 
the profession, especially in complex 
cases. However, courts should be more 
willing to take a hard look at the cus- 
tomary practice where a plaintiff can 
produce some evidence that the prac- 
tice is out-of-date or ineffective and 
thereby dangerous. 
Cases falling into the latter two 
categories of medical errors have been 
more troublesome to courts attempting 
to make tort law responsive to changes 
in medical practice. Judicial expansion 
of malpractice liability, making physi- 
cians accountable for a range of medi- 
cal errors, has run counter to legisla- 
tive reforms in the malpractice area. 
Over the past decade, state legislatures 
responding to the “malpractice crisis” 
have abrogated or restricted the opera- 
tion of legal doctrines from res ipsa 
loquitur to informed consent.26 But 
judicial recognition of the centrality of 
the hospital setting has marked several 
recent landmark cases. Thus, hospitals 
have been subjected to an expansion 
of the respondeat superior doctrine 
and held responsible for the alleged 
negligence of physicians practicing 
within them, even when the physi- 
cians were independent contra~tors.~’ 
An alternative theory of “corporate 
negligence” has been based on the 
premise that a hospital owes its pa- 
tients a duty to exercise ordinary care 
in supervising its staff.** 
A movement toward strict liability 
for hospital services, analogous to that 
which exists for some products, may 
also be developing. Some hospitals 
have been held liable for harm caused 
by medical instruments used in treat- 
ing ~ a t i e n t s . 2 ~  Courts have usually dis- 
tinguished the rendition of profes- 
sional services from the sale of 
goods.30 In recent cases, however, 
courts have begun to examine the 
basis for strict liability in the medical 
context. In Hoven u. Kelble, the Sup- 
reme Court of Wisconsin, while reject- 
ing strict liability for medical services, 
noted the similarity between consum- 
ers purchasing products and consumers 
seeking medical care: 
The typical purchaser of medical 
services cannot evaluate the 
quality of care offered because 
medical services are complex 
and infrequently bought. The 
medical care market gives the 
purchaser little assistance in 
enabling the purchaser to evalu- 
ate what he or she is buying. It is 
generally the physician - not 
the patient - who determines 
the kind of services to be ren- 
dered and how often . . . . The 
physician is in a better position 
than the patient to determine 
and improve the quality of the 
services, and the patient’s re- 
liance on the doctor’s skill, care 
and reputatian is perhaps greater 
than the reliance of the con- 
sumer of goods.32 
InJohnson v. Sears, Roebuck B 
Company, 33 a federal district court 
held strict liability to be a permissible 
theory of recovery for defects in 
mechanical and administrative ser- 
vices in hospitals. This court assumed, 
without deciding, that strict liability 
would “not apply to professional medi- 
cal services by But it rea- 
soned that such an exemption should 
There is a trend toward linking 
tort liability with the predictabd- 
ity of harmful results and the 
ability to discover and prevent 
them. Expanded liability pro- 
vides a substantial incentive to 
providers to improve risk man- 
agement programs or to face the 
bad publicity and increased in- 
surance premiums which litigas 
tion brings. 
not apply to “those services which 
hospitals perform for both doctors and 
patients,” because of the “public 
interest” in having these services 
“performed pr~perly.”~’ 
The Illinois Supreme Court has 
held that a hospital may be found 
strictly liable for the quality of blood 
which it provides for transfusion.36 
Similarly, a Florida appellate court 
held that a supplier of blood for trans- 
fusion could be held liable for resulting 
harm unless it could be factually de- 
termined that impurities in the blood 
could not be detected or pre~ented.~’  
These cases represent a trend to- 
ward linking tort liability with the 
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predictability of harmful results and 
the ability to discover and prevent 
them. Courts are coming to recognize 
that hospitals are in the best position 
to monitor iatrogenic effects traceable 
to their own services, and that ex- 
panded liability provides a substantial 
incentive to providers to improve risk 
management programs or to face the 
bad publicity and increased insurance 
premiums which litigation brings. Ex- 
panded liability may therefore create a 
generalized pressure to alter the work 
setting in favor of better recordkeep- 
ing, more frequent conferences on ad- 
verse outcomes, more consultations, 
and evaluation of procedures not only 
for cost, but also for iatrogenic impact. 
Other malpractice law develop 
ments may also result in alteration of 
professional attitudes and practices. 
The doctrine of informed consent, 
while still bitterly resisted by parts of 
the medical profession,3* has had 
some impact on medical disclosure 
practices, resulting in more clearly ar- 
ticulated disclosures by physicians of 
hazards and a1ternati~es.I~ Legal rules, 
if they are seen as technical and there- 
fore only mechanically applied, are of 
little use, but when the values inher- 
ent in such doctrines as informed con- 
sent become internalized, there will be 
more changes and further reforms. 
Medical Errors and Predictability 
The tort law concept of foreseeability 
of harm provides the core justification 
for a concept of medical culpability 
which can encompass all four cate- 
gories of medical errors discussed 
above. Foreseeability involves a pre- 
diction, at a time prior to the occur- 
rence of an injury, of the type of injury 
that might result from a treatment 
error, of its severity, and of the prob- 
ability that such an injury will occur.4o 
The use of “foreseeability of harm” as 
the dominant test of a duty to prevent 
injury requires the actor either to take 
precautions or to face liability, where 
harm is likely to occur and the victim 
has neither consented to nor can avoid 
the harm. 
The focus of predictability of risk 
moves us from the individual within a 
professional group to the capabilities 
of the group itself, or to the institu- 
rional setting, the hospital. Culpabil- 
ity is linked to predictability and to 
the ability of the profession to alter 
the level of risk, which it is able to 
predict .4 I 
ity will be derived from the increased 
predictive powers of modern medi- 
cine, through its new technologies and 
the use of statistics. As institutions 
come to know more precisely the ex- 
tent of the risks associated with their 
activities, the ascription of responsibil- 
ity and culpability becomes possible 
and fair.‘* Even if a medical provider 
cannot predict the whole range of risks 
associated with his services, he is in a 
better position, compared to the pa- 
tient, to detect and correct as many as 
possible. It is a question of the relative 
advantage of the parties. Judicial ex- 
pansion of liability, whether through 
the application of the doctrine of strict 
liability, res ipsa loquitur, or informed 
consent, assumes that the physician 
controls his own acts. It further as- 
sumes that the physician has some 
power to diminish the risk to patients, 
either by his own initiative or by ag- 
gregating resources with other mem- 
bers of the profession. 
Tort law, crude and arbitrary as it 
may seem to some, has a role to play in 
exposing medical errors. The malprac- 
tice suit can signal the need for change 
in the habits of the individual prac- 
titioner or in the institutional prac- 
tices of the hospital. It may help to 
expose the ethical renegades, the Dr. 
Norks; it may provide direct deterrent 
effects, through dollar judgments and 
the psychic costs of involvement in 
litigation.‘] More importantly, litiga- 
tion may articulate new duties, val- 
idating existing norms or promoting 
the centrality of new ones. It may ar- 
ticulate new concepts of responsibility 
and require the medical specialities to 
re-examine their diagnostic procedures 
and treatment modalities. It may, by 
expanding the liability of institutions 
which increasingly dominate health 
care delivery, alter the work setting. 
Litigation has the advantage of not re- 
quiring a new piece of legislation or 
new administrative machinery to put 
its reforms into operation. It can be 
triggered by a single plaintiff, and once 
its intervention is sought, a court must 
act on the case before it. 
The recent studies of iatrogenesis 
suggest that the problem is real and 
In each case, the test for foreseeabil- 
substantial, but that the medical pro- 
fession still seeks to avoid linking cul- 
pability with medical error. Nor is it 
uncommon to blame the legal system 
for medicine’s own tardiness in imple- 
menting effective monitoring of iat- 
rogenic harms. Malpractice suits may 
be the best source of regulation cur- 
rently available for iatrogenic out- 
comes in the health care system. 
Proposals to reform the medical mal- 
practice system will be inadequate if 
they ignore this primary need to deter 
bad medical practices.44 
The medical establishment needs 
to be made more aware of the risks it 
creates. Accordingly, future reforms 
must note the real problems of medical 
error and the incentives for correction 
provided by malpractice litigation. 
Any “no fault” system or national 
health insurance plan, if it seeks to 
reduce medical malpractice and ensu- 
ing litigation, must also provide an al- 
ternative means of detering iatrogenic 
outcomes. 
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